USA v. Andre Evans by unknown
2017 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-2-2017 
USA v. Andre Evans 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Andre Evans" (2017). 2017 Decisions. 425. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017/425 
This May is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2017 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 16-2395 
 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
ANDRE EVANS, 
  Appellant 
      
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 2-15-cr-00423-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Harvey Bartle, III 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 27, 2017 
 
Before: AMBRO, VANASKIE, and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: May 2, 2017) 
 
 
OPINION* 
 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
 Andre Kairi Evans was driving a rented vehicle in Philadelphia with a suspended 
driver’s license.  After police officers determined that the license plate did not match the 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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make or model of the vehicle, they attempted to stop him.  In response, Evans sped away 
as the officers chased him.  Although Evans ultimately crashed the car, the chase did not 
end there: he then fled afoot.  During this next phase of the chase, the officers observed 
Evans dispose of what appeared to be a handgun.  He eventually was apprehended, and 
police retrieved the firearm that had been in his possession. 
 Evans pled guilty to being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  Under the Sentencing Guidelines, his recommended range was 
140 to 175 months’ imprisonment, but it was adjusted to 120 months because of the 
statutorily authorized maximum sentence.  After considering the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 
factors, the District Court sentenced him to 96 months. 
 On appeal, Evans raises for the first time that the District Court failed to consider 
the § 3553(a) factors as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3584(b) in determining whether the 
imposed sentence was to run consecutively or concurrently with an expected state court 
sentence for a separate parole violation.  And, he argues, if the federal sentence were to 
run consecutively to the forthcoming state court sentence, it would be unreasonable and 
must be vacated.  We disagree. 
 Because Evans’s specific procedural challenge to his sentence is raised for the first 
time on appeal, we review the District Court’s decision for plain error.  United States v. 
Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 255 (3d Cir. 2014).  In doing so, we determine if he has 
demonstrated that there was: “(1) an error; (2) that is plain; and (3) that affected 
substantial rights.”  United States v. Dobson, 419 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation 
omitted).  In such a case, relief may be granted “only if the error seriously affects the 
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fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.”  Id. (quotations and 
alterations omitted).  Inasmuch as Evans also claims substantive unreasonableness of the 
sentence imposed, we review the District Court’s decision for abuse of discretion.  See 
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).   
 As to Evans’s challenge that the District Court committed procedural error in 
failing to decide expressly whether his federal sentence was to run concurrently or 
consecutively with a separate state court sentence that, although anticipated, had not yet 
been imposed—no error exists.  The crux of his argument is that the Court violated 18 
U.S.C. § 3584(b), which provides that 
[t]he court, in determining whether the terms imposed are to be ordered to 
run concurrently or consecutively, shall consider, as to each offense for 
which a term of imprisonment is being imposed, the factors set forth in 
section 3553(a). 
 
The consideration of whether concurrent or consecutive sentences is warranted, however, 
is subject to § 3584(a), which provides that 
[i]f multiple terms of imprisonment are imposed on a defendant at the same 
time, or if a term of imprisonment is imposed on a defendant who is already 
subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment, the terms may run 
concurrently or consecutively . . . .   
 
 Despite Evans’s contention on appeal, the Supreme Court has made this statutory 
framework inapplicable to situations where a federal court sentences a defendant who is 
awaiting a state court sentence yet to be imposed.  Setser v. United States, 566 U.S. 231, 
234-35 (2012).  Indeed, where “the state sentence is not imposed at the same time as the 
federal sentence, and the defendant was not already subject to that state sentence[,]” 
§ 3584(a) cannot apply because the defendant is not “already subject to an undischarged 
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term of imprisonment” required to trigger the statute.  Id.  That is the case here, and the 
reasoning makes sense: there is no other existing sentence to which the federal sentence 
could possibly run concurrently or consecutively.  Per the statute and the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of it—particularly in situations as is the one here—the District 
Court did not plainly err.1 
 Nor was the sentence here substantively unreasonable.  Evans insists that if his 
federal sentence is to run consecutively with his anticipated state court sentence, which 
he predicts will be 16 months, his total sentence will be 112 months rather than the 96-
month sentence imposed by the District Court.  Even if that result occurred, there is 
nothing unreasonable about it.  As an initial matter, the federal sentence imposed by the 
District Court is still 96 months regardless what the state court decides to impose for an 
entirely separate violation.  But even so, the combined sentence is still well below the 
initial recommended Guidelines range (140 to 175 months) and the statutory maximum 
(120 months).  As such, and given that the District Court properly considered all of the 
requisite §3553(a) factors, Evans’s sentence is not substantively unreasonable.  See Rita 
v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 364-65 (2007). 
 Accordingly, we affirm.  
                                              
 1 Evans also argues that the District Court committed procedural error by ignoring 
§ 5G1.3(d) of the Sentencing Guidelines, which provides that “the sentence for the 
instant offense may be imposed to run concurrently, partially concurrently, or 
consecutively to the prior undischarged term of imprisonment to achieve a reasonable 
punishment for the instant offense.”  As discussed, there is no “prior undischarged term 
of imprisonment” to which this provision of the Sentencing Guidelines would apply.   
